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In late June, with “astounding” audacity, he ordered Nimitz to prepare to invade Tulagi in the Solomon Islands without approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or President Franklin Roosevelt. The first side to impose its will on the other would control the pace of future operations.Īdmiral King recognized the importance of the opportunity and seized it. The defeat forced them to pause but did not transfer the initiative to Admiral Chester W. Prior to Midway, the Japanese held the initiative and controlled the operational tempo. The Battle of Midway in June 1942 generally is considered the turning point of World War II in the Pacific, but the description is too generous. The process involved is just as relevant today as it was in 1942. Lessons from the battles off Guadalcanal led to new techniques that ensured dominance later in the war. The rapid pace of learning was most apparent in the development of the Navy’s surface warfare doctrine. King was confident they would evolve their approaches faster than their opponents he was correct.
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By fighting the Japanese, the Navy’s officers identified flaws in existing doctrine and created new techniques. Admiral King knew his forces could learn rapidly and believed the best way to unleash their potential was to take the offensive immediately. Fleet (COMINCH), has been criticized for insisting that the Pacific Fleet take the offensive so quickly, with the Pacific theater a secondary priority to Europe and insufficient resources available to secure victory. King, then serving as both CNO and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Frequently derided as “Operation Shoestring” because of inadequate preparations and sparse logistical support, the campaign was a significant test of the Navy’s combat doctrine. The invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942 triggered a six-month struggle for control of the seas, skies, and jungles surrounding the island. Seventy-five years ago, the Navy’s ability to learn at high velocity and rapidly evolve tactical doctrine led to operational success. This learning system proved its value in late 1942 during the Guadalcanal campaign, when lessons from the fighting were quickly harnessed-and eventually became instrumental to victory in the Pacific during World War II. In the early years of the 20th century, in particular, the Navy had developed a system that allowed continual reassessment, refinement, and evolution of tactical doctrine. Navy’s historical experience demonstrates the value of rapid learning.
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has called for “high-velocity learning at every level” and stressed its importance to innovation and effective tactics.
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